国陣最新A錢方式 - 发債券

tanglk

这是最新 A 錢的方式，不是买贵了，而是借貴了。如果你熟悉債券市場，你就看得懂这篇文章。

http://www.kinibiz.com/story/iss ... pricing-losses.html
內容貼在第二楼。

整個 transaction 的負責人是 Jho Low, 那個在 Psy 表演后吃飯的胖子。一转手，就賺了四十亿，所以要請多几十個国际艺人來又沒問題。
由於1MDB是由政府担保，最后还是人民埋單。

到目前为止除了一個 blog 有报导外, 还沒看到有报章有提到。
http://steppenwolf-kanghwa.blogspot.com/2013/03/1mdb.html

由於債券並不是每個人都懂，即使是會計師也不見得明白整個 transaction。

tanglk

Kinibiz 的原稿

Even before it had any business, 1Malaysia Development Bhd or 1MDB’s first move was to raise money, issuing RM5 billion in bonds, subsequently taking it up to RM20 billion. The deals caused a fluster because of attractive yields. Preliminary calculations indicate 1MDB could have lost as much as RM4 billion through mispricing. Question is, was it deliberate?

-----------------------


Preliminary calculations by KiniBiz with the help of bond specialists show that mispricing of 1Malaysia Development Bonds could have been as high as 20% of the total bonds involved, or some RM4 billion on bonds issued or in the process of issue of some RM20 billion

investment-stock-market-genericBond issues made by 1Malaysia Development Bhd (IMDB) have raised substantial interest because of their attractive interest rates. But investors have found to their chagrin that they are unable to subscribe and the bonds are issued to a select club instead through private placements.

“I would have loved to get my hands on those bonds,” one bond trader said.

Basically what happen is that the bonds are priced to yield more than the market rates. And because these bonds are long term, they yield higher interest rates over many years. Once they are on the market, the prices adjust to yield returns with comparable securities, giving windfall gains to those who got in on the first floor.

It’s just yet another example of financial shenanigans that routinely take place in the world today with big name investment banks associated with them and working hand-in-hand with the issuers.

For this to happen, the transactions need to take place in private with as little of the terms as possible coming into public hands so that few notice the mispricing. The secondary trading too often takes place under veils of secrecy to stop prying eyes from discerning how much the players have made.

Bonds are financial instruments that need to be handled with care because there is one variable that can send their values tumbling – or rising. That is interest rates. If a bond is priced to yield more than comparable yields, the value of the bond can be considerably different.

Just altering the effective interest rate to yield two percentage points more than comparable bonds can result in a RM5 billion 10-year bond being mispriced by RM1 billion or more.

And the longer the term of the bond the greater the possibility of mispricing the bonds. If you misprice the bonds, the value can be off by 20 percent or more. On RM5 billion that amounts to one billion ringgit. On RM20 billion, it could account for as much as RM4 billion or more.

1mdb-bonds-3.01MDB raised RM5 billion in Malaysian currency bonds in May 2009, US$1.75 billion (RM5.55 billion) in May 2012 and US$3 billion (RM9.3 billion) to make a total of RM19.85 billion, just shy of RM20 billion (see table).

The first was arranged by local investment bank AmInvestment Bank Group.

The second, arranged by Goldman Sachs, was issued to part finance 1MDB’s RM8.5 billion acquisition of Tanjong Energy, which holds power ventures, from tycoon Ananda Krishnan. It was jointly guaranteed by 1MDB and International Petroleum Investment (IPIC), a unit of the Abu Dhabi government. The last is yet to be confirmed but was reported  by Bloomberg.

When 1Malaysia Development Bhd, then Terengganu Investment Authority or TIA, raised money via bonds in May 2009, it did with a real bang. Two things stood out – the effective interest rate was considered rather attractive for the buyer and it had the longest tenure of any local bond at 30 years. And it was safe because it was explicitly guaranteed by the Malaysian government.

Just as it got local investors excited, it disappointed them. Bond traders said the bonds were privately placed and no local institution had access to them. This mouthwatering bond was apparently not accessible to most. The list of those who took the bonds were never disclosed.

The coupon rate of the RM5 billion bonds was 5.75% a year payable semi-annually. On top of that, the bond was issued at roughly a 12 percent discount to its par value, which increased the yield. According to the 1MDB annual report, the yield was 6.71%.

There was one problem with this bond though. There was no comparable bond with that tenure. Even government securities went out only as far as 20 years. Cagamas bonds, which have no explicit government guarantee, traded at around 5.28% then, with Malaysian government bonds trading at around 50 basis points less, at about 4.8%.

Bond analysts say a 25-30 basis point premium to government bonds is okay for a bond with an explicit government guarantee. Adding another 30 basis points for 10 years more in tenure would give a fair yield of around 5.4%. Instead, the effective annual rate was 6.71 per cent while the coupon rate was 5.75 percent.

possible-losses-5.0Using a bond calculator, the bond price would have been undervalued by about 20% (see table on mispricing). That means those who obtained the bond at that price and then subsequently sold it on the secondary market would have made about RM1 billion on the RM5 billion face value of the bond.

In its books, 1MDB as at Mar 31 2010, some 10 months after the deal, listed the carrying value of the bonds at RM4.39 billion while the fair value was listed at RM5.26 million, a valuation gap of RM870 million.

Trading on these bonds are thin, but the last trade done earlier this month was at a yield of 4.5 per cent which prices the bond at around RM1.20 for a RM1 par value bond. This is an increase of more than a third over the 88 sen that it was issued at in May 2009.

Similarly, we can do the same for the other bonds and the indications are that pricing is off by about 20% in each case, leaving a total mispricing loss of about RM4 billion.

The second bond for US$1.75 billion attracted international financial media attention when it was issued in May last year and was described as a “mysterious private placement” by respected financial review IFR Asia, a unit of Thomson Reuters.

“The jumbo US$1.75 billion deal is one of the biggest privately placed US dollar bonds on record from Asia, and a big payday for sole arranger Goldman Sachs. The few available details, however, have posed more questions than they answer, with rival bankers quick to suggest that 1MDB overpaid for the deal.

“With Malaysian oil major Petronas, which is lower rated at A1 (Moody’s) trading at Treasuries plus 185 basis points on May 21 (2012), this means the 1MDB paper was priced 240 basis points back of its nearest comparable in the Malaysian sector,” it said.

oilrig-ringgit-malaysiaIFR Asia added that even if comparison were made with other like-rated oil sector issuers, the trade still was higher by 213 basis points.

A Financial Times blog posed this question: “Bankers are wondering why an Abu Dhabi government investment fund would guarantee what is essentially Malaysian sovereign debt. After all, 1MDB has secured a Malaysian state guarantee in the past. Why is a Gulf emirate, many miles away, guaranteeing this bond?”

Since 1MDB has not revealed pricing and other details for the third and largest bond for US$3 billion or RM9.3 billion, it is only possible to make estimates but the order of magnitude of the losses are likely to be correct, analysts said.

Where does the money come from when a bond is mispriced and how is it possible to make so much upfront, virtually at the time of the issue?

Essentially what happens is that a mispricing of just 200 basis point or two percentage points is reflected in the cash flow that comes back to bondholders over a long time. The mispricing represents the value in current price terms of this stream of cash flows and is an upfront realisation.

If we take the RM5 billion bond,  two percent works out to RM100 million a year and over 30 years that amounts to RM3 billion in all

Who makes the money? At the end of the day it will be the intermediaries. But if it is deliberately done, everyone gets a share with the biggest share going to those who initiated and masterminded it.



  

kiasukia

靠着现任首相就可只手遮天的富三代。

现在槟城疯狂烧钱就是为了要帮现任首相确保地位。

刘德祖(Jho Low)是槟城赫赫有名的刘姓家族第3代孙子。其祖父刘明达是早期商界和华团广为人所知的人物，父亲拿督刘福平更是商界知名人士，MWE工程公司的创办人。


http://www.bensewang.com/mingren/101593_2.html

Ryan.fx

1MDB 发行由政府担保的债卷，贱卖发行给一些神秘人物，这些人转手在公开市场卖掉就可以大赚几十亿。当中牵涉很多不透明交易，例如借了67亿给来历不明的PetroSaudi等，花几十亿收购一些不是很有潜能的能源公司。一切交易非常低调处理，知道的人不多，就算知道也不明白因为这些复杂的金融交易不是一般人可以理解。

cct2050

类似雷曼兄弟的垃圾债

庞氏骗局的一种

最后买家是傻子

tanglk

cct2050 发表于 31-3-2013 06:01 PM
类似雷曼兄弟的垃圾债

庞氏骗局的一种

大馬政府担保，怎會是垃圾債，除非大馬的評級跌到垃圾評級。

cct2050

tanglk 发表于 31-3-2013 06:06 PM
大馬政府担保，怎會是垃圾債，除非大馬的評級跌到垃圾評級。

现在不是

雷曼兄弟的垃圾债开始也是 AAA 等级

欧债未爆之前，也是政府担保，也是 AAA 等级

債券评价再下调就是了


现在美系银行钱满过头，就是这些机构买

Ryan.fx

就好像100块的钞票，大平卖88块给某些人，你说拿些人好赚吗？当然卖家不怕破产，因为有中央政府担保的。

1035834

摆明是正大光明打枪人民。债卷应该会是EPF 认购。呸！狗阵不倒，人民连草都没得吃。

cct2050

1035834 发表于 31-3-2013 06:17 PM
摆明是正大光明打枪人民。债卷应该会是EPF 认购。呸！狗阵不倒，人民连草都没得吃。

EPF 有

外国银行，基金也有

当欠债无法还时

银行基金会要求补偿优质资产如土地，国有企业给他们

这些银行基金不是笨蛋

tanglk

cct2050 发表于 31-3-2013 06:32 PM
EPF 有

外国银行，基金也有

买家全是外国人，直接接洽，本地的投資者沒有份。
其实本地資金过剩，要找买家很容易。

我本身的公司有发过債券，由我責負。
一般上，公司是用半拍买 (英文：book building) 的方式來推低利息。1MDB的方式簡直是 "揾笨".